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THE HAROLD J. BERMAN LECTURE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM—A SECOND-CLASS RIGHT?
Mary Ann Glendon∗
ABSTRACT
Although the Bill of Rights does not establish a hierarchy among the values
it seeks to protect, Supreme Court decisions over time have classified certain
rights as essential to a fundamental scheme of ordered liberty. The prominent
place of the First Amendment’s provisions protecting religious freedom on this
“Honor Roll of Superior Rights” has seldom been openly challenged. Recent
legal, political, and cultural developments, however, prompt the question
whether religious freedom is becoming, de facto, a lesser right—one that can
be easily overridden by other rights, claims, and interests.
On the legal front, as freedom of religion comes into increasing conflict
with nondiscrimination norms and claims based on abortion rights and various
lifestyle liberties, the rights of religious entities to choose their own personnel,
and even to publicly teach and defend their positions on controversial issues,
are coming under intense attack. The deferential standard of review adopted
by the Supreme Court in 1990, moreover, has put a considerable damper on
efforts to mount effective legal challenges to restrictions on free exercise.
A political consequence of the Court’s deferential standard has been not
only to discourage religious persons and groups from defending their rights
but also to embolden those who aim to reduce the influence of religion—
especially organized religion—in American society. Nor is the status of
religious freedom as secure in American culture as it once was. Recent social
science data indicates that, ironically, the social consensus behind religious
freedom seems to be weakening just when pathbreaking work has begun to
document the social and political benefits of religious freedom.
I conclude that among these legal, political, and cultural challenges, the
most ominous is cultural. For, as Learned Hand once said, if liberty dies in the
∗ Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard University. This text is adapted from the author’s lecture on
the same subject, held on September 20, 2011, as part of the Harold J. Berman Lecture.
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hearts of men and women, “no constitution, no law, no court can save it.” That
does not mean that the legal and political efforts carried on by friends of
religious freedom are fruitless. Whether religious freedom retains a prominent
place on the honor roll of superior rights will certainly depend to some extent
on those efforts. But even more decisive will be the attitudes and behavior of
religious believers and leaders themselves.
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I’m deeply grateful to the Center for the Study of Law and Religion and the
Aquinas Center of Theology for the invitation to present this lecture in
memory of my late colleague and friend Harold Berman. I am well aware that
to speak about religious liberty at Emory University is something like
presuming to lecture the Pope on moral theology. But I ask your indulgence,
first, because religious freedom mattered deeply to Hal; second, because
Emory is renowned for its hospitality to dialogue on the perennial questions in
that field; third, because I hope it will be of interest to you to hear about the
ideas and concerns that emerged from an international conference on religious
liberty that was held at the Vatican in May 2011 under the auspices of the
Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences;1 and, finally, because I look forward to
hearing your ideas about how seriously one should take these concerns.
Let me begin with just a word about the Pontifical Academy. It is a kind of
think tank founded in 1994 by Pope John Paul II to help keep Catholic social
thought abreast of current developments in law, politics, economics, and the
other social sciences. To that end, its thirty-seven members are drawn from
five continents and diverse disciplines. They include a number of nonCatholics as well as two Nobel Prize winners in economics. In an effort to be
as well-informed as possible, we hold a four-day symposium each year to
which we invite a group of distinguished outside experts to help us achieve a
clear understanding of whatever problem we are currently studying.
This year we set out to explore the dilemmas that arise from maintaining
that religious freedom is a universal right despite the manifest cultural,
political, and religious differences that exist in the world.
But as so often happens in academic life, research begun on one question
can lead to new questions that send one’s thoughts in other directions. And so,
as I reflected on the presentations at the Rome conference, I must say that I
became less concerned about the dilemmas of universality and more uneasy
about the status of religious freedom as a fundamental right. My thoughts
turned in that direction not only because of the recent alarming increase in
religious persecution around the world, and not only because of more subtle
trends in Western nations, and not only because of the prevalence of negative
attitudes toward religion in the academy, the media, and other influential
1 The contributions to this conference, the 17th Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social
Sciences, can be found in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY: THE CASE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (Mary Ann Glendon & Hans F. Zacher eds., 2012). These contributions are referenced throughout
this lecture.
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sectors of society. What was new, at least to me, were indications that less
value is being attached to religion and religious freedom in the places where I
would have hoped that it was most secure—namely, in the minds and hearts of
citizens in the liberal democracies, including the United States.
I would be very glad to be persuaded that this last concern is misplaced, not
only because I believe in the importance of religious freedom as such but also
because I believe with George Washington, Alexis de Tocqueville, and many
others that religion and religious freedom are indispensable supports for our
country’s great experiment in ordered liberty. I also tend to think, as did Pope
John Paul II, that the status of religious freedom is a kind of litmus test, or
“touchstone,” for the protection of human dignity generally.2
Those views, of course, are not universally shared. Although religious
freedom has been acknowledged as a fundamental right by nearly every nation
in the world, formal consensus, like that embodied in Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 has not led to agreement on its
meaning and foundations, nor on its relation to other fundamental rights, nor
on modes of bringing the right to life under diverse cultural conditions. Hence
the question I would like to explore in this lecture: whether religious freedom
is becoming a lesser right, one that can be easily overridden by other rights,
claims, and interests. That question, I hardly need to say, is a question about
the status of religious freedom in the culture as well as in the law.
Let me begin with three items of disturbing news presented by social
scientists at the Rome conference in May 2011.
The first involves recent assessments of the state of religious freedom
worldwide. On the basis of the most extensive cross-national surveys of
religious freedom ever made, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life has
reported that nearly 70% of the world’s people live in countries where there are
“high restrictions” on religious freedom due to governmental policies or social
hostilities or both.4 Not surprisingly, the brunt of these restrictions falls on
2

JUSTICE
2002).
3

Pope John Paul II, Address to the Diplomatic Corps (Jan. 9, 1989), in PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR
AND PEACE, JOHN PAUL II AND THE FAMILY OF PEOPLES 161, 168 (L’Osservatore Romano trans.,

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at
74 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”).
4 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 1 (2009) [hereinafter
GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION]; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, RISING RESTRICTIONS ON
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religious minorities. Worldwide, 75% of victims of violent religious
persecution are Christian.5
There is also cause for concern for those of us who are fortunate enough to
live in countries that impose only “low” to “moderate” restrictions on religious
freedom. For, although the threats are much less dramatic in the United States
and Western Europe, religious freedom in the liberal democracies is at
heightened risk from, inter alia, the erosion of conscience protection for
religious individuals and institutions, restrictions on the autonomy of religious
institutions, and inroads on the rights of parents regarding the education of
their children.6
The third—and in some ways, the most unsettling—item came from a
presentation by sociologist Nicos Mouzelis of the London School of
Economics who began by recalling three well-known aspects of modernity that
have had an impact on religious trends: increased geographical mobility with a
corresponding decline in people’s attachments to communities of memory and
mutual aid, the increased separation among the various spheres of human
activity (home, work, worship, education, recreation, and so on), and the rise
of individualism.7 Together, he said, those hallmarks of modernity have
accelerated the spread of elite attitudes about religion from intellectuals,
philosophers, and the educated classes to men and women in all walks of life.8
He was alluding not only to the growth of secularism but to changes in the
attitudes of people who describe themselves as religious. Noting the great
growth of “non churched religiosity” in Europe and the United States,
Mouzelis concluded that, at least in the West, “the turn to an ultraindividualistic form of religiosity is here to stay.”9 If that is true, it may well
RELIGION 7, 17 (2011) [hereinafter RISING RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION]. The studies cover 198 countries and
territories, representing more than 99.5% of the world’s population. GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION,
supra, at 4; RISING RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION, supra, at 9.
5 Nina Shea, Report: 3/4 of Religious Persecution Is Anti-Christian, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 17,
2011, 2:19 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262411/report-34-religious-persecution-anti-christiannina-shea (citing Terry Murphy, New Report Reveals 75 Percent of Religious Persecution Is Against
Christians, AID TO THE CHURCH IN NEED (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.acnuk.org/news.php/205/
ukinternational-new-report-reveals-75-percent-of-religious-persecution-is-against-christians).
6 See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Freedom in a Worldwide Setting: Comparative Reflections, in
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 359; Allen D. Hertzke, Religious
Freedom in the World Today: Paradox and Promise, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF
DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 108.
7 See Nicos Mouzelis, Modernity: Religious Trends, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF
DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 71.
8 See id. at 75.
9 Id. at 78.
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have important implications for religious liberty. For the more that religion is
seen as a private, solitary matter, the greater the likelihood that concern about
free exercise of religion will become less intense.
My initial reaction to the Mouzelis paper was that his observations were far
more applicable to Europe than to the United States. According to a recent
survey by the European Union, only 52% of Europeans say they believe in
God, though 27% more say they believe in a “spirit” or “life force.”10 Another
survey showed that, when given a list of twelve “values” and asked to pick the
three that they consider most important, only 7% of Europeans listed religion.11
Forty-six percent said they thought religion has too important a place in
society.12 Americans, by contrast, are much more likely to say they believe in
God or a “universal spirit” (92%),13 and a majority of those polled say that
religion is “very important” in their lives.14 A public opinion survey published
twenty years ago found that most Americans ranked freedom of religion very
high among fundamental rights—in fact, a bit ahead of freedom of speech.15
But on close examination, recent data on U.S. attitudes and practices is
consistent with Mouzelis’s individualization thesis. Two of the most striking
trends are the increasing proportion (16%) of Americans who decline to
affiliate with any organized religion16 and of those who describe themselves as
“spiritual” instead of “religious” (between 18% and 33%).17 Add to this that
disillusionment with organized religion is widespread18 and that the Pew
Forum’s survey of young Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-

10 EUROPEAN COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 225: SOCIAL VALUES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9
(2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf.
11 EUROPEAN COMM’N, STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 66: PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 28
(2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf.
12 Id. at 41.
13 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND
PRACTICES: DIVERSE AND POLITICALLY RELEVANT 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/
report2-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
14 Id. at 22.
15 ROBERT O. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 10 (1991).
16 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 20 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/reportreligious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
17 MARK CHAVES, AMERICAN RELIGION: CONTEMPORARY TRENDS 40 (2011); ROBERT C. FULLER,
SPIRITUAL, BUT NOT RELIGIOUS 4–5 (2001); George H. Gallup Jr., Americans’ Spiritual Searches Turn
Inward, GALLUP (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/7759/americans-spiritual-searches-turn-inward.
aspx.
18 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES
US 99 (2010).
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nine found that they are considerably less religious than previous generations
were at the same age.19 I am not aware of any recent survey asking Americans
to rank the importance of religious freedom, but it is reasonable to assume that
as the idea of religion as a private, solitary activity spreads, interest in religious
liberty will decline.
If Mouzelis is right that individualistic attitudes toward religion are
spreading from elites to the population at large, many factors are doubtless
involved. So far as the law is concerned, the Supreme Court has long been a
stronghold of such attitudes. Since the 1940s, Supreme Court majorities have
tended to treat religion as primarily an affair between the individual and his or
her God.20 These rulings have given short shrift not only to the vast numbers of
Americans for whom the existence of a worshipping community is essential to
religious experience but also to the social settings where religious “beliefs and
practices [a]re generated, regenerated, nurtured . . . , and transmitted” from one
generation to the next.21
This latter point has important political as well as religious implications.
For, as Richard Garnett—commenting on recent legal trends in First
Amendment law—has cautioned, there is reason “to worry that the individual
conscience, standing alone, is not up to the task of creating and sustaining the
conditions necessary to ensure religious freedom.”22 Garnett points out that just
as freedom of speech depends not only on one’s right to say what’s on one’s
mind, but on the existence of institutions like newspapers, universities,
libraries, parties, and associations, so freedom of religion also involves
protecting the institutions that nourish individual free exercise.23

19 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, RELIGION AMONG THE MILLENNIALS 1 (2010), available at
http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Demographics/Age/millennials-report.pdf.
20 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (finding that “religious beliefs worthy of respect
are the product of free and voluntary choice”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“Fundamental to the conception of religious liberty protected by the Religion
Clauses is the idea that religious beliefs are a matter of voluntary choice by individuals . . . .”); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that religion “must be a private matter
for the individual”); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that the purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause is “to secure religious liberty in the individual”).
21 Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 543–44 (1991).
22 Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008).
23 Id. at 274.
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Our legal system’s neglect of the associational and institutional dimensions
of religious freedom, though punctuated with some notable exceptions,24 seems
to be accelerating. As freedom of religion comes into conflict with claims
based on nondiscrimination norms, abortion rights, and various lifestyle
liberties, the freedom of religious entities to choose their own personnel, and
even to publicly teach and defend their positions on controversial issues, is
coming under increased attack. For example, the definition of “religious
employer” in the regulations issued in 2011 by the Department of Health and
Human Services25 is so narrow as to deny conscience protection to most
groups that would wish to claim it. Student religious groups at many
universities have been denied recognition on the basis of their refusal to
ascribe to school policies forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion or
sexual orientation.26 Moreover, the deferential standard of review adopted in
Employment Division v. Smith puts a considerable damper on efforts to mount
effective legal challenges to restrictions on free exercise.27
These developments have placed church-affiliated hospitals, schools, and
social services in a difficult position. Faced with the choice between moral
compromise and expensive litigation with an uncertain outcome, many have
simply retreated from the field—as was the case when Catholic Charities of
Boston decided in 2006 to close down its adoption services rather than mount a
full-scale attack on state licensing requirements that would not have permitted

24 E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that states may provide tuition
vouchers to families that will use them at religious schools); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(holding that New Jersey’s antidiscrimination statute did not override the association’s right to maintain its
policy against openly homosexual scoutmasters); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing religious employers to use religious criteria in hiring
employees for nonreligious jobs); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a tax exemption for
religious properties used for worship); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding that a
New York statute violated the free exercise rights of a church by interfering with its internal affairs).
25 Health Insurance Reform Requirements for the Group and Individual Health Insurance Markets, 76
Fed. Reg. 46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B)).
26 See Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University Antidiscrimination Policies and
Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882, 2882 (2005). In 2010, a closely divided Supreme
Court ruled that public universities can refuse to recognize student groups, like the Christian Legal Society,
that restrict membership to persons who support the group’s beliefs. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2973–74 (2010).
27 See 494 U.S. 872, 884–86 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006), as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131
S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
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it to operate consistently with Catholic teaching about marriage.28 On the
horizon is the prospect that religiously affiliated hospitals may be required to
choose between shutting down and providing services that violate their
religious beliefs.
Do such developments mean that religious freedom is becoming a secondclass right? Although the U.S. Constitution does not impose a hierarchy of
rights, the Supreme Court has long classified certain rights as fundamental to
our system of ordered liberty,29 creating what Henry Abraham called an
“Honor Roll of Superior Rights.”30 It was on that basis that the Court held most
of the Bill of Rights to have been incorporated by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and thus to be binding on the states.31
The effect of the Supreme Court’s approach to incorporating the First
Amendment’s religion language, however, was to drive a wedge between the
free exercise and establishment provisions. Instead of treating these provisions
as designed to work together to promote religious freedom, the Court has
regularly subordinated free exercise to a broad construction of the
nonestablishment language.32 With the Court’s adoption of a deferential
standard of review in Employment Division v. Smith in 1990, religious freedom
has dropped a few more notches on its “honor roll.”
The legal academy, with some exceptions, has uncritically accepted the
Court’s tendency to treat nonestablishment as the basic end to which some
derogation may cautiously be permitted in favor of the free exercise of
religion. Laurence Tribe, for example, has described the free exercise provision
as carving out a zone where “permissible accommodation” of religious
interests may take place.33 Some legal scholars have even suggested that
specific protection for religious freedom may be redundant in view of existing
protections for freedom of expression and association and existing

28 See Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, CATHOLIC
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm.
29 E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (distinguishing between certain constitutional
rights on the basis of whether they are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
30 HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 17 (8th ed. 2003).
31 See 2 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 773 (2d ed. 1988).
32 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 21, at 535.
33 TRIBE, supra note 31, § 14-4, at 1169.
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antidiscrimination law.34 That, as Cole Durham has observed, is quite an
interesting move because increased protection in most areas of human rights
law is generally regarded as a sign of the importance of the rights in question.35
“No one,” he points out, “seems exercised about redundant non-discrimination
provisions.”36 Meanwhile, legal developments, like the Smith decision, that
discourage religious persons and groups from asserting their rights have
emboldened the interest groups that aim to reduce the influence of religion,
especially organized religion, in American society.
At the time when President Bush’s faith-based initiatives were being
widely debated, Professor Noah Feldman claimed in a New York Times
Magazine article to have found the “solution” to the problems of church–state
law.37 Feldman’s proposal is that the courts should “offer greater latitude for
religious speech and symbols in public debate, but also impose a stricter ban
on state financing of religious institutions and activities.”38 In other words: Let
people have their holiday displays on public property, and even let them have a
moment of silence at the beginning of the school day, but ban tuition vouchers
and shut down experiments with the use of faith-based organizations to deliver
social services.
Feldman argued that his approach should be welcomed by both secularists
and evangelicals and that it would in fact “close the rift between them.”39
Evangelicals, he wrote, should like his idea because they would only be giving
up vouchers and, in return, would be getting recognition for the public symbols
of religion.40 Feldman was silent on what secularists would get from his
solution, but his proposal sounds very much like a secularist divide-andconquer strategy: Let’s destroy the religious right by driving a wedge between
those who are more concerned about religion in public settings and those who
are more concerned about protecting the existence and identity of religious
institutions. Let’s marginalize the communities whose messages are most
critical of the values of a materialistic and hedonistic society. Let’s penalize
parents who do not wish to subject their children to secular proselytizing in
34 E.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 6, 13 (2007); James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941,
943 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 72 (2001).
35 Durham, supra note 6, at 383.
36 Id.
37 Noah Feldman, A Church–State Solution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 3, 2005, at 28, 32.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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government schools. And as for the disadvantaged persons who are the
primary beneficiaries of the services provided by faith-based organizations,
let’s leave them to the tender mercies of the state.
Regarding the various efforts to marginalize religion in American life, I
think that stalwart defender of religious freedom, Michael McConnell, put it
best when he said, “If religious liberty has become controversial again in our
liberal society—and it has—it is not because either religion or liberty has
changed, but because liberalism has changed. And not for the better.”41
Liberalism, he warns, may be becoming “not a set of political arrangements by
which persons of widely differing views can live together in relative harmony,
but a narrow and sectarian program enforcing its dogmas by force.”42
At this point, I must make clear that I would not wish to be understood as
minimizing the very real risks and dilemmas posed by direct or indirect public
assistance to religious entities. Nor do I wish to minimize the difficulty of
defining the scope and limits of a religious body to govern itself according to
its own norms. As many critics of governmental faith-based initiatives have
observed, the conditions attached to government assistance can cause religious
organizations to stray from their distinctive mission and become dependent on
the government.43 But because the government controls so much of the
nation’s educational and social services, the vitality and mission of religious
agencies are also threatened if religious schools, hospitals, and other bodies are
denied assistance while secular bodies receive it.44
The point I wish to emphasize is that to ignore the associational and
institutional dimensions of religious freedom not only harms the religious
groups and the individuals to whom those groups are important; it also has
implications for our democratic experiment. A society that aspires to be both
free and compassionate cannot afford to neglect the health of the families,
religious groups, and other communities of memory and mutual aid that are our
principal seedbeds of character and competence.45 As Emory’s John Witte and
Christian Green point out in the introduction to their latest book, the religious
41 Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243,
1244 (2000).
42 Id. at 1259.
43 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1593, 1605.
44 See id.
45 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 137 (1991); Mary Ann Glendon, The Cultural Underpinnings of
America’s Democratic Experiment, in BUILDING A HEALTHY CULTURE 41, 41, 53 (Don Eberly ed., 2001).
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institutions and other mediating structures that stand between the state and the
individual not only help to create the conditions for the realization of civil and
political rights but also provide many important social goods including
education, health care, child care, and employment, among others.46 And they
often can do so far more efficiently, effectively, and humanely than agencies of
the state.47
I believe that is why Harold Berman wrote twenty years ago that he hoped
for a reinterpretation of the First Amendment’s religion language that “would
permit not only ‘religion’ to cooperate with ‘government’ but ‘government’
openly to cooperate with ‘religion’—without discrimination for or against any
belief system (and hence without establishment) and without coercion (and
hence without restriction upon free exercise).”48
Having dwelt thus far on disquieting legal and cultural developments, I am
glad to be able to report that some of the news the Pontifical Academy heard
from social scientists last spring was quite encouraging—especially the new
research that bears on the relation of religion and religious freedom to what
one might call a country’s moral ecology. Allen Hertzke, for example, reported
on pathbreaking studies that challenge the oft-repeated claim that religion is a
particular source of social division and strife.49 That claim—almost a mantra in
secular circles—implies that religion is practically a suspect category.50
Yet an important and growing body of empirical evidence reveals that the
political influence of religion is in fact quite diverse, sometimes contributing to
strife, but often fostering democracy, reconciliation, and peace.51 Some studies
indicate that violence actually tends to be greater in societies where religious

46

RELIGION

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 16 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds.,

2012).
47 That argument was first powerfully made in PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO
EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 159–63 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996).
48 Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in ARTICLES OF FAITH,
ARTICLES OF PEACE 40, 53 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
49 See Hertzke, supra note 6, at 114–17.
50 For an analysis of the role that ideas about religious “divisiveness” have played in First Amendment
jurisprudence, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667
(2006).
51 Hertzke, supra note 6, at 113–17; see also MONICA DUFFY TOFT ET AL., GOD’S CENTURY: RESURGENT
RELIGION AND GLOBAL POLITICS 7–8 (2011); Brian J. Grim & Roger Finke, Religious Persecution in CrossNational Context: Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 647–52
(2007).
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practice is suppressed52 and that promotion of religious freedom actually
advances the cause of peace by reducing interreligious conflict.53 Further
research will be needed to discover the mechanisms that link religious freedom
to religiously motivated violence or to its reduction in diverse societies. But the
results thus far should give pause to those who claim that religion is inherently
divisive.
For one thing, those who automatically associate religion with strife may
be confusing religious conflicts with identity politics. It is often “the
sacralization of identity”—rather than religion as such—that lies at the heart of
conflicts to which religious labels have been attached.54 The religious rhetoric
and symbolism associated with such conflicts may have more to do with issues
of individual and group identity than with theological differences.
A second important set of findings suggests a positive correlation between
religious freedom and other important human goods.55 The Pew Forum’s Brian
Grim has found that “[t]he presence of religious freedom in a country
mathematically correlates with . . . the longevity of democracy” and with the
presence of civil and political liberty, women’s advancement, press freedom,
literacy, lower infant mortality, and economic freedom.56 Correspondingly,
there is a significant correlation between the denial of religious freedom and
the absence of these economic, social, and political goods. While more
research is needed on these linkages, they provide encouraging empirical
support for Pope John Paul II’s intuition that the state of religious freedom is a
kind of litmus test for the state of human rights generally.
Now, if we put the news from the social scientists on changing religious
attitudes together with the recent findings on the positive role of religion in
society, we arrive at what Professor Hertzke calls “a profound paradox”—that
just when pathbreaking work has begun to document the societal benefits of
religious freedom, the longstanding social “consensus behind it is weakening,
assaulted by authoritarian regimes, attacked by theocratic movements, violated

52 BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2011).
53 THOMAS F. FARR, WORLD OF FAITH AND FREEDOM 18–19 (2008).
54 Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalist and Other Obstacles to Religious Toleration, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 456, 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 See Hertzke, supra note 6, at 114–17).
56 Brian J. Grim, Religious Freedom: Good for What Ails Us?, REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF., Summer 2008,
at 3, 4.
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by aggressive secular policies, and undermined by growing elite hostility or
ignorance.”57
To this I would add a second paradox—that just when longstanding, elite
attitudes toward religion are allegedly spreading through the population in
general, several prominent secular thinkers have had second thoughts.
Philosophers Jürgen Habermas58 and Marcello Pera59 have called attention to
the importance of the Judeo–Christian heritage in sustaining liberal democracy,
while Bernard-Henri Lévy has expressed concern about the spread of bias
against Christianity.60
No serious thinker, of course, disputes that the preservation of a free
society depends on citizens and statespersons with particular skills, knowledge,
and qualities of mind and character. But many secular theorists have simply
assumed that a free society can get along fine without religion and that the
more closely religion is confined to the private sphere, the freer everyone will
be. Some have maintained that the experience of living in a free society is
sufficient in itself to foster the civic virtues of moderation and self-restraint,
respect for others, and so on.61
That complacent opinion is becoming harder to sustain, however, with so
many of the country’s families, schools, religious groups, and other seedbeds
of civic virtue currently in distress.62 It is hard to resist the conclusion that our
57

Hertzke, supra note 6, at 108.
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION 3 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008)
[hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS
151 (Ciaran Cronin & Max Pensky eds. & trans., 2006) [hereinafter HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS].
59 MARCELLO PERA, WHY WE SHOULD CALL OURSELVES CHRISTIANS: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF FREE
SOCIETIES 5–7 (L.B. Lappin trans., 2011).
60 French philosopher and professed atheist Bernard-Henri Lévy expressed his concern in 2010 that antiChristian “prejudice and especially major anti-clericalism . . . is taking on enormous proportions in Europe.”
Prominent Atheist Says Catholicism Is Least Tolerated Religion in Europe, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Sept.
24, 2010, 3:27 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/prominent-atheist-says-catholicism-is-leasttolerated-religion-in-europe/.
61 For overviews of the positions of leading political theorists on this issue, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON,
LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); PERA, supra note 59, at
26–33. Galston states his own position thus: “Liberalism contains within itself the resources it needs to declare
and to defend a conception of the good and virtuous life that is in no way truncated or contemptible. This is not
to deny that religion and classical philosophy can support a liberal polity in important ways. . . . But it is to
deny that liberalism draws essential content and depth from these sources.” GALSTON, supra, at 304.
Nevertheless, Galston favors an accommodationist approach to religion on the ground that religion can help to
support liberal values. Id. at 279.
62 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION 4–6, 37, 47–48, 52 (1999); see also Mary Ann
Glendon & Pierpoalo Donati, Towards Achieving Solidarity with Children and Young People in Our
58
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liberal societies have been living for quite a while on inherited social capital—
and that, like profligate heirs, we’ve been consuming our inheritance without
bothering to replenish it.
That is why thinkers like Habermas and the Italian philosopher–statesman
Marcello Pera have begun to speak out about the political costs of neglecting a
cultural inheritance in which religion, liberty, and law are inextricably
intertwined, and to question whether liberal states can afford to be indifferent
or hostile to religion.63 They have begun to ask questions like: Where will
citizens learn to view others with respect and concern, rather than to regard
them as objects, means, or obstacles? What will cause most men and women to
keep their promises, to limit consumption, to answer their country’s call for
service, and to lend a hand to the unfortunate? Where will a state based on the
rule of law find citizens and statesmen capable of devising just laws and then
abiding by them? What is the role of religion in supporting the commitment to
common values—the minimal social cohesion—that every free society
requires?
Habermas has gone so far as to concede that the good effects that some
philosophers have attributed to life in free societies may well have had their
source in the legacy of the “Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of
love.”64 In his case, it was concern about biological engineering and the
instrumentalization of human life that led him to conclude that the West cannot
abandon its religious heritage without endangering the great social and
political advances that are grounded in that heritage. “The liberal state,” he has
written, “depends in the long run on mentalities that it cannot produce from its
own resources.”65 A professed atheist and political leftist, he stunned many of
his followers when he announced he had come to think that
[t]his legacy [of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of
love], substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual
critical appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no
alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a

Globalized World, in 12 PONTIFICAL ACAD. SOC. SCIS., VANISHING YOUTH? SOLIDARITY WITH CHILDREN AND
YOUNG PEOPLE IN AN AGE OF TURBULENCE 543 (Mary Ann Glendon & Pierpaolo Donati eds., 2006).
63 Pera has written two books, one a dialogue with Pope Benedict XVI (then Joseph Ratzinger), on the
danger of forgetting Europe’s cultural debt to Christianity. See PERA, supra note 59; JOSEPH RATZINGER &
MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM, CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM (Michael F. Moore trans.,
2006).
64 HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS, supra note 58, at 151.
65 HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION, supra note 58, at 3.
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postnational constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of
66
this heritage. Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.

In a similar vein, Pera writes, “Without the Christian vision of the human
person, our political life is doomed to become the mere exercise of power and
our science to divorce itself from moral wisdom; our technology to become
indifferent to ethics and our material well-being blind to our exploitation of
others and our environment.”67
And so, the wheel of elite opinion may—just possibly—be coming back
full circle to the views of those who, like George Washington and Alexis de
Tocqueville, held that the free society was profoundly dependent on a healthy
moral culture nourished by religion (by which they understood Judeo–
Christianity).68 In Democracy in America, Tocqueville—himself a religious
skeptic—urged his fellow intellectuals to lay aside their bias against religion.
Lovers of liberty, he said, should “hasten to call religion to their aid, for they
must know that the reign of freedom cannot be established without that of
mores, nor mores founded without beliefs.”69 Religion, he continued, is “the
safeguard of mores; and mores as the guarantee of laws and the pledge” for the
maintenance of freedom itself.70
But what if Allen Hertzke is right when he says that just when the social
value of religious freedom is becoming ever more apparent, the longstanding
“consensus behind it is weakening”?71 Or, what if Charles Taylor is right when
he speaks of the sense that the basic values that have fostered social cohesion
in the United States are “less cherished and less widely recognized among its
citizens than in the past”?72
In some respects, our current situation is reminiscent of the progression that
Tocqueville described in The Old Régime and the French Revolution. In the
66

HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS, supra note 58, at 151.
PERA, supra note 59, at 60.
68 George Washington said in his Farewell Address to the People of the United States that no one should
claim to be a patriot if he works “to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the
duties of men and citizens. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained
without religion.” George Washington, President, Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept.
19, 1796), in S. DOC. NO. 106-21, at 20 (2000).
69 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 11 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds.
& trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
70 Id. at 44.
71 See Hertzke, supra note 6, at 108.
72 Charles Taylor, Religion in a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE, supra note 48,
at 93, 113.
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late seventeenth century, he tells us, religious irreverence became fashionable
among French elites who, “not satisfied with cultivating it between
themselves, . . . propagated their ideas among the lower classes.”73 The effect,
he says, was not to leave a void. Rather, the place of religion was promptly
taken “by a host of new loyalties and secular ideals that not only filled the void
but (to begin with) fired the popular imagination.”74 Moreover, “Those who
retained their belief in the doctrines of the Church became afraid of being
alone in their allegiance and, dreading isolation more than the stigma of
heresy, professed to share the sentiments of the majority.”75 The way was thus
prepared, in his view, for “[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown
breed . . . : men who carried audacity to the point of sheer insanity; who balked
at no innovation and, unchecked by any scruples, acted with an unprecedented
ruthlessness.”76
The United States seems far from such a point. But if religious freedom is
on the road to becoming a lesser right—in law and culture alike—it behooves
friends of religious liberty to think hard about what can be done to shift those
trends in a more favorable direction. No serious person disputes that religious
freedom has to be harmonized with other fundamental rights, or that it is
subject to necessary limitations in the interests of public health and safety. But
the devil, as they say, is in the details. On the one hand, the more broadly
religious freedom is conceived, the more tensions arise among individual
religious freedom, the autonomy of religious bodies, other fundamental rights,
and the legitimate interests of the state. Yet, one of the principal ways in which
religious liberty is violated is by construing it so narrowly as to confine it to
the private sphere. There is no simple formula for striking the balance.
At the recent meeting of the Pontifical Academy, there was ready
consensus among the diverse participants that there is no one-size-fits-all
model for religious freedom. But there was much discussion of the thorny issue
of its legitimate scope and limits.
The prevailing juridical approach to these problems of scope and limits in
liberal democracies is for constitutional courts to use pragmatic legal

73 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD RÉGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 155 (Stuart Gilbert trans.,
Doubleday Anchor Books 1955) (1856).
74 Id. at 156.
75 Id. at 155.
76 Id. at 157.
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techniques to achieve balance among the various freedoms.77 Some at our
meeting expressed doubts, however, about whether such balancing feats can be
accomplished in a principled manner. Moreover, there are well-known costs to
the practice of entrusting hotly contested social issues to the courts when there
is no clear constitutional warrant for doing so. Because constitutional
adjudication effectively closes the door on further resort to ordinary
democratic processes of debate, education, and persuasion, Professor AnNa’im advocated a “‘people-centered’ approach”78 that would “promote the
ability of local communities to protect their own rights,” rather than rely too
heavily on the “ambiguities and contingencies” of official action.79
Not surprisingly, no agreement was reached on these dilemmas at the Rome
meeting, but there was broad consensus that religious liberty ultimately
depends on the habits and attitudes of citizens and statespersons—that is, on
culture. On that point, one of our invited experts, Professor Joseph Weiler,
offered some wise observations from a comparative perspective. Professor
Weiler, an observant Jew who successfully argued in support of Italy in the
recent crucifix case before the European Court of Human Rights, praised that
court’s decision for recognizing that there can be a number of valid modes of
protecting religious freedom.80 In a press release issued at the time of the
decision, he said:
Europe is special in that it guarantees at the private level both
freedom of religion and freedom from religion, but does not force its
various Peoples to disown in its public spaces what for many is an
important part of the history and identity of their States, a part
recognized even by those who do not share the same religion or any
religion at all. It is this special combination of private and public
liberties, reflecting a particular spirit of tolerance, which explains
how in countries such as, say, Britain or Denmark to give but two
examples, where there is an Established State Church no less—
Anglican and Lutheran respectively—Catholics, Jews, Muslims and,
77 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–44 (2002) (balancing individuals’ interests in
educational freedom with the rights emanating from the nonestablishment language of the First Amendment).
78 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Experiences in Freedom of Religion in the African Context, in UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY supra note 1, at 193, 195.
79 Id. On the necessity and complexity of striking the balance, see Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Review,
Local Values, and Pluralism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2009).
80 Joseph H.H. Weiler, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue—On Religious Freedom and
Religious Symbols in Public Places, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 1,
at 578, 578–82, 587). The crucifix case can be found at Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS.
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=883169&portal=
hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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of course, the many citizens who profess no religious faith, can be
entirely “at home,” play a full role in public life including the holding
of the highest office, and feel it is “their country” no less than anyone
else. It is an important model for the world of which Europe can be
81
justly proud.

Weiler warned, however, that legal measures based on the concept of
legitimate pluralism will only work if they are supported by a culture of mutual
respect and genuine tolerance.82 This means, he explained, that in countries
like Italy where an accommodationist model exists, special care has to be taken
to assure respect for persons of all faiths and no faith. The practice of such
countries, he said, can be
hugely important in the lesson of tolerance it forces on such states
and its citizens towards those who do not share the [majority]
religions and in the example it gives the rest of the world of a
principled mediation between a collective self-understanding rooted
in a religious sensibility, or religious history, or religiously-inspired
83
values and the imperative exigencies of liberal democracy.

By the same token, he added, special care must be taken in countries like
France where a secularist model prevails to avoid marginalizing religion and
religious believers.84
As regards the classroom, he specified:
[I]t falls in equal measure on those States who forbid any religious
symbol on their classroom walls, and those who require it, to ensure
that the prohibition or requirement are not misunderstood by the
young members of our society. The prohibition of religious symbols
should not be understood as a denigration of religion or religious
people and the requirement of a religious symbol such as the cross,
should not be understood as denigrating other religions or those who
85
do not profess a religious faith at all.

81

Press Release, Straus Inst. for the Advanced Study of Law & Justice (Mar. 18, 2011) (on file with

author).
82

Weiler, supra note 80, at 581.
Id.; cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Diplomatic Corps for the Traditional Exchange of New
Year Greetings (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.zenit.org/article-31404?l=english (“The particular
influence of a given religion in a nation ought never to mean that citizens of another religion can be subject to
discrimination in social life or, even worse, that violence against them can be tolerated.”).
84 Weiler, supra note 80, at 587.
85 Press Release, Straus Inst. for the Advanced Study of Law & Justice, supra note 81.
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Because I agree with Professor Weiler’s emphasis on the priority of culture,
I would like to conclude with this thought: whether religious freedom will rise
or decline in status as a fundamental right will depend to some extent on the
legal and political efforts in which many supporters of religious liberty are
engaged, but it will depend even more on the attitudes and actions of religious
believers and leaders themselves. Theirs is the responsibility to educate and
encourage their co-religionists to the responsible exercise of religious freedom.
It is up to them to find ways to advance their religiously grounded moral
viewpoints with reasoning that is intelligible to all men and women of good
will. It is up to each religious group to reject ideologies that manipulate
religion for political purposes or that use religion as a pretext for violence. It is
up to each religious group to find resources within its own traditions for
promoting respect and tolerance. And it is up to them to resist the divide-andconquer strategies that, if successful, could install secularism as the established
religion of the United States.
Those are weighty challenges. For what hangs in the balance is nothing less
than whether religion will be a destabilizing force in our increasingly diverse
societies or will help to hold together the two halves of the divided soul of
American democracy—our love of individual freedom and our sense of a
community for which we all bear a common responsibility.

